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STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 is determinative of the 
Court's ability to award attorney's fees and costs to the 
appellant if the trial court's judgment is reversed. It states: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees 
to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of 
the promissory note, written contract, or 
other writing allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees. 
There are no other determinative constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules. 
-2a-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 2 
ISSUES PRESENTED 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Nature and History of the Case 3 
Statement of Facts 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THE TRIAL COURT' S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW 
DISREGARDS THE CLEAR INTENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE PARTIES. 8 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS SECOND AND THIRD CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ADDRESSING FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, APPLIED 
ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARDS 10 
A. Third Conclusion--"Unconscionability" 10 
B. Second Conclusion--"Without Fault" 11 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT BELL DID 
NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPUDIATE THE ADVERTISING 
AGREEMENT 15 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK NEGATES A DEFENSE OF MUTUAL 
MISTAKE 18 
CONCLUSION 20 
ADDENDUM 22 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Bentlev v. Potter. 694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984) 11, 12 
Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture 
Co. . 770 P. 2d 88 (Utah 1988) 12, 14 
Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. . 
658 P. 2d 1199 (Utah 1983) 16 
Nielsen v. MFT Leasing. 656 P. 2d 454 (Utah 1982) 14 
Plas-Tex. Inc. v. U. S. Steel Corp. . 772 S. W. 2d 442 
(Texas 1989) 17 
Polyglvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P. 2d 449 (Utah 
1979) 12 
Robert Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P. 2d 554 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) 18 
Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 2 
Stewart v. Coffman. 748 P. 2d 579 (Utah App. 1988) 2 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (d) 2 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 21 
Other Authorities 
S. Williston, The Law of Contracts (3d ed. 1961) 9, 11, 12 
Restatement fSecond) of Contracts § 157 (1979) 14, 20 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, 
Plaintiff 
BRUCE 
INC. , 
vs 
BELL & 
a Utah 
Defendant 
and 
• 
INC. , ) 
Appellee, ) 
ASSOCIATES, ) 
Corporation, ) 
and Appellant. ) 
Case No. 900543-CA 
Priority No. 16 
Appeal from Third Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Salt Lake Department, Judge Edward A. Watson 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Paul H. Van Dyke 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
Attorneys for Appellee 
261 East 300 South #175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Eric C. Olson (4108) 
Douglas C. Tingey (5808) 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 South Main St. , Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a Judgment entered in the Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, on October 3, 1990. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
a. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
holding under the undisputed facts that there was not a failure 
or lack of consideration? 
b. Was the trial court' s legal conclusion that the 
contract between the parties did not give appellant the right to 
reject said contract upon reasonable notice of a defect erroneous 
as a matter of law? 
c. Was the trial court' s legal conclusion that there 
was no mutual mistake of fact upon which the parties entered into 
their contract erroneous as a matter of law? 
Standard of Review as to each issue: The facts as 
found by the trial court in this case are not in dispute. Thus 
the issues raised are questions of law and the trial court' s 
conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference. Scharf 
v. BMG Corp. . 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), Stewart v. 
Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature and History of the Case 
This case centers on a contract for billboard 
advertising services between the parties to this action 
(hereinafter the "Advertising Agreement"). Pursuant to The 
Advertising Agreement, the appellee Outdoor Systems, Inc. 
("Outdoor Systems") contracted to provide billboard advertising 
services on Interstate 19 south of Tucson, Arizona, for the 
appellant, Bruce Bell & Associates, Inc. ("Bell"). There is no 
dispute that the billboard actually provided by Outdoor Systems 
was not visible from the highway. Bell rejected the contract and 
refused pay for the billboard. Outdoor Systems then brought an 
action on the Advertising Agreement in the Third Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake County. The matter was tried on August 7, 1990, before 
Judge Edward A. Watson. On October 3, 1990, Judge Watson entered 
his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and rendered judgment 
against Bruce Bell in the amount of $10,040.24. (The Findings 
and Conclusions are found at Record No. 56-65. Each reference 
hereinafter to this pleading will be to a specific numerical 
paragraph of the "Findings" or "Conclusions". A copy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is submitted herewith as 
an addendum.) On October 17, 1990, Bell filed its Notice of 
Appeal. 
-3-
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Statement pf FfrgtS 
The facts in this case were undisputed at trial. The 
facts relevant to the legal issues to be addressed by this Court 
are as follows: 
At all times pertinent to this appeal, Bell was an 
advertising agency doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Finding No. 2. ) Bell was directed by one of its clients to 
arrange for a billboard advertisement that would attract 
travelers along Interstate 19 near Nogales, Arizona to the Kino 
Springs golf course resort south of Tucson, Arizona. (Finding 
No. 6. ) The billboard was to follow a pictorial concept used in 
earlier magazine advertisements done by Bell for Kino Springs. 
(Finding No. 5. ) Bell contacted Outdoor Systems, an outdoor 
advertising company in Arizona, regarding a new board under 
construction along Interstate 19 south of Tucson. (Findings Nos. 
1, 8. ) 
Before the parties entered into the Advertising 
Agreement, Outdoor Systems sent Bell a packet of information on 
the board containing, among other things, pictures of the board 
and certain dimensions. (Finding No. 9. ) This information 
indicated that the proposed billboard was a "cross reader," i. e. , 
to be read across the highway as opposed to from the same side. 
It is now known that the sign was approximately 200 yards from 
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lanes of traffic 
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on Interstate 19. (Finding No. 33. ) The data needed to make 
this crucial measurement was to be found in the files of Outdoor 
Systems; however, it was never disclosed to Bell. 
Because of the distance and relative expense involved, 
Bell did not visit the site of the board. (Finding No. 11.) 
Nonetheless, a representative of Bell' s client with no 
advertising expertise did drive by the board to verify that it 
was there. (Finding No. 12.) Steve Brossart, ("Brossart"), 
Outdoor System' s representative, was the only person with 
advertising experience to actually see the board and its relation 
to Interstate 19 before the advertisement was placed on it. 
(Trial Transcript, pp. 45, 48.) Brossart was fully aware that 
Bell would not visit the proposed billboard and he had no reason 
to believe that anyone else with expertise to evaluate the 
suitability of the board would see it. (Trial Transcript, pp. 
48-49. ) 
On December 7, 1988, Bell and Outdoor Systems entered 
into the Advertising Agreement pursuant to which Outdoor Systems 
agreed to install Bell' s advertisement on the board and 
thereafter to rent it to Bell at a rate of $800,00 per month. 
(Defendant' s Exhibit 3C. ) Bell then developed the advertisement 
desired for the board and forwarded it to Outdoor Systems. 
(Findings Nos. 15, 18.) The advertisement included a realistic 
depiction of Kino Springs with wording directing travelers to 
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Kino Springs. (Finding No. 15. ) After receiving artwork for the 
proposed advertisement in mid-January, 1990, Outdoor Systems 
contacted Bell and suggested that the advertisement be changed to 
make the directional wording at the bottom of the ad larger and 
thus more visible. (Finding No. 20. ) Bell agreed to follow 
Outdoor Systems' recommendation and the advertisement so modified 
was installed on the board. (Finding No. 21. ) 
Brossart admitted at trial that the location of the 
billboard made it impossible for the advertisement to be read by 
passers-by on Interstate 19. (Finding No. 32. ) Soon after the 
sign was placed on the billboard on February 15, 1989, Bell was 
informed by its client that the sign was not visible from the 
highway and that it did not approve the sign. (Findings Nos. 22, 
25. ) Bell communicated this information to Outdoor Systems 
within a reasonable time after the advertisement was installed. 
(Finding No. 26; Trial Transcript p. 58 [Testimony of Steve 
Brossart, sales manager for Outdoor Systems]). To cure the 
billboard' s defective condition, Bell proposed that the sign be 
repainted in all lettering. (Finding No. 26. ) However, Outdoor 
Systems refused to bear the cost of repainting to cure the 
deficiency. (Finding No. 28. ) Unable to obtain a satisfactory 
solution, Bell rejected the Advertising Agreement in writing 
within a reasonable time, according to its terms. (Finding No. 
-6-
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31 Trial Transcript p. 62 [testimony of Steve Brossart, sales 
manager for Outdoor Systems]. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The undisputed facts in this matter show that 
Outdoor Systems provided a sign to Bell that was not visible from 
the highway. The trial court erroneously concluded that nothing 
in the Advertising Agreement between the parties required Outdoor 
Systems to provide a sign location which would be effective. 
Effective advertising was, however, the essence of the contract 
between the parties. The trial court' s narrow interpretation is 
not supported by law or fact. 
2. The trial court further erred by applying 
erroneous legal standards to the issue of failure of 
consideration. The trial court incorrectly held that the 
standard for failure of consideration was unconscionability and 
further applied a narrow definition of the "without fault" 
requirement at variance with Utah authorities. When proper 
standards are applied, the undisputed facts show that a failure 
of consideration did occur. 
3. The trial court' s interpretation of paragraph 10 
of the Advertising Agreement is also erroneous as a matter of 
law. The only reasonable interpretation of paragraph 10 was that 
Bell had the right to reject the Advertising Agreement. 
-7-
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4. Finally, the trial court incorrectly incorporated 
an assumption of risk standard as part of its analysis of the 
issue of mutual mistake. In so doing, the trial court 
misconstrued the applicable legal principles. The Advertising 
Agreement was entered into on the assumption by both parties that 
the sign would be visible from Interstate 19. That assumption 
was incorrect and the contract should be rescinded on grounds of 
mutual mistake. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW DISREGARDS 
THE CLEAR INTENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES. 
A single erroneous theme pervades the trial court' s 
conclusions of law; and it is on this error, contained in 
Conclusion No. 1, that the decision adverse to Bell turns. The 
trial court's first conclusion of law states: 
The Court finds that the defendant 
failed to pay the contract amount based upon 
its expectation that the plaintiff would 
provide a sign location which would be 
effective. The Court finds that there is 
nothing in the contract which requires the 
plaintiff to meet this expectation of 
Defendant. Rather, the plaintiff s 
contractual duty was to faithfully reproduce 
the sign from the artwork provided to it by 
defendant. 
(Conclusion No. 1. ) 
This conclusion violates the "fundamental rule in the 
interpretation of agreements that we should ascertain the prime 
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object and purpose of the parties. ,f 4 S. Williston, The Law of 
Contracts, § 619, p. 733 (3d ed. 1961). The "prime object and 
purpose" of the Advertising Agreement was to provide effective 
billboard advertising space for Kino Springs golf course, i.e., 
advertisement that could catch the attention of passing motorists 
and communicate the intended message. (Trial Transcript, pp. 36-
38, 47-48. ) Having executed a contract with such an "object and 
purpose," Outdoor Systems undertook a broader range of duties 
than, as the trial court concluded, just affixing artwork to a 
board. Clearly, Outdoor Systems was selling much more than that. 
It was also selling the location of the billboard. The 
visibility of the billboard from that location was of central 
importance. To attract attention and convey a message, the 
billboard at a minimum had to be visible from the highway. Well 
executed art work was not enough. 
Before entering into the Advertising Agreement, Outdoor 
Systems knew full well the location, limitations, and 
measurements of the proposed board space in question. Outdoor 
Systems also knew that Bell, an out-of-state company, would not 
view the board and had no direct knowledge of these particulars. 
As a consequence, Outdoor Systems was on notice that Bell was 
relying exclusively on the information supplied by Outdoor 
Systems in making its decision to lease the board. Yet, Outdoor 
Systems neglected to provide Bell with this critical information. 
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Rather, it remained silent until the Advertising Agreement was 
executed. 
While the trial court recognized no duty on the part of 
Outdoor Systems beyond affixing the artwork to the billboard, 
Outdoor Systems itself recognized a broader duty when, in mid-
January, 1989, it expressed to Bell concern as to the visibility 
of the proposed sign. These acts—although too little and too 
late — clearly demonstrate that Outdoor Systems knew it was 
selling more than artwork. Further, it is without dispute that 
Outdoor Systems recognized the limited visibility of the 
billboard well before any artwork was in place. The trial 
court' s conclusion that Outdoor Systems' only duty under the 
Advertising Agreement was to affix artwork to a billboard is 
erroneous as a matter of law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS SECOND AND THIRD CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ADDRESSING FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, APPLIED 
gRRQNEQUg LEgAL STANDARD?. 
The trial court' s second and third conclusions of law 
deal with failure of consideration and are erroneous as a matter 
of law. 
A. Third Conclusion--"Unconscionability" 
The trial court' s third conclusion of law states: 
The court finds that although there may 
have been unequal consideration in this 
contract that the disparity in consideration 
was not unconscionable and, therefore, does 
not find a failure of consideration by reason 
10-
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of unconscionability in the disparity of 
consideration. 
(Conclusion No. 3). 
"Unconscionability" is not the legal standard by which 
a failure of consideration is measured. The correct standard for 
failure of consideration, as stated in Bentley v. Potter, 694 
P. 2d 617, 619 (Utah 1984), is "wherever one who has either given 
or promised to give some performance fails without his fault to 
receive in some material respect the agreed exchange for that 
performance." Id. (quoting 6 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts 
§ 814, at 17-78 (3d ed. 1962) (emphasis added)). Consideration 
fails, not when the disparity in exchange is "unconscionable," 
but when, as in this case, the agreed performance fails in "some 
material respect". The correct standard is materiality. There 
can be no dispute that Outdoor Systems' performance was 
materially deficient and that Bell failed to receive the agreed 
exchange for its performance. The trial court' s third conclusion 
is erroneous as a matter of law. 
B. Second Conclusion--"Without Fault" 
The trial court' s second conclusion of law states: 
The defendant has defended against 
Plaintiff s claim on the basis that there was 
no [sic] failure of consideration. The Court 
finds that there was no such failure of 
consideration because such a finding requires 
a finding that the party making the claim be 
without fault. The court specifically finds 
and concludes that the defendant was 
negligent by not viewing the sign location 
-11-
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itself prior to the completion of the 
contract. 
(Conclusion No. 2. ) The court' s application of a strict 
negligence standard to the failure of consideration analysis 
constitutes reversible error. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed failure 
of consideration in Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance 
& Furniture Co. , 770 P. 2d 88, 91 (Utah 1988): 
Failure of consideration (as opposed to lack 
of consideration) exists 'wherever one who 
has either given or promised to give some 
performance fails without his fault to 
receive in some material respect the agreed 
exchange for that performance. ' Bentlev v. 
Potter. 694 P.2d 617, 619 (Utah 1984) 
(quoting 6 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts 
§ 814, at 17-78 (3d ed. 1962)). If there is 
a lack of consideration, there is no 
contract. When consideration fails, however, 
promised performance cannot be compelled. 
See also Polvalycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P. 2d 449, 451 (Utah 
1979) ("a failure of performance which 'defeats the very object 
of the contract' or '(is) of such prime importance that the 
contract would not have been made if default in that particular 
had been contemplated' is a material failure" warranting 
rescission). 
The trial court found only that Bruce Bell was 
"negligent by not viewing the sign location itself prior to the 
completion of the contract. " (Conclusion No. 2. ) This legal 
conclusion reflects a misperception of both the facts and the 
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law. Bell' s failure to view the sign before entering the 
Advertising Agreement does not constitute "fault." Bell violated 
no contractual or common law standard of care. Rather, Bell 
proceeded reasonably in a manner consistent with the express and 
implied representations of Outdoor Systems that the board could 
effectively carry an advertising message. Outdoor Systems was a 
large, experienced outdoor advertising company with full 
knowledge of the board' s limitations. Further, Outdoor Systems 
knew it was dealing with an out-of-state company that, by reason 
of distance and economy, must rely on Outdoor Systems for 
information and professional service. Outdoor Systems had no 
reason to believe that Bell or any agent with experience 
sufficient to evaluate the suitability of the board would 
actually see the board before entering into the Advertising 
Agreement. Bell did all that it could reasonably do to ascertain 
the suitability of the board before entering into the Advertising 
Agreement. Conversely, before executing the Advertising 
Agreement, Outdoor Systems did not advise Bell of any limitation 
regarding the board. Bell was "without fault" in entering into 
this contract. 
The trial court also erred in adopting an overly broad 
legal construction of "without fault." Whereas, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a party claiming a failure of consideration 
need not be completely without fault, the trial court rejected 
-13-
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the failure of consideration of defense upon the slightest 
showing of what it perceived to be "fault." In Nielsen v. MFT 
Leasing, 656 P. 2d 454 (Utah 1982), the plaintiff brought an 
action on a computer lease agreement. The defendant raised the 
affirmative defense of failure of consideration alleging that the 
computer delivered had a different serial number than the one 
described in the lease. Because the defendant had accepted 
delivery of the computer, there was evidence that both parties 
were "at fault" to some extent in allowing the misdelivery. 
Nonetheless, the court held that failure of consideration 
rendered the contract unenforceable. ££. at 456-57. See also 
Copper State Leasing Co, v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co. , 
770 P. 2d 88, 91-92 (Utah 1988) (construing Nielsen and pointing 
out the evidence that "both parties were at fault to some 
extent" ). 
The application of the law in Nielsen and Copper State 
finds support in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Section 
157 states that fault will only bar a party' s relief when it 
amounts to "a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with 
reasonable standards of fair dealing. " Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 157 (1979). Comment (a) to Section 157 points out 
that during negotiations "each party is held to a degree of 
responsibility appropriate to the justifiable expectations of the 
other." Id. at § 157 comment a (1979). 
-14-
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Without question, Bell met this standard of good faith 
and fair dealing. It was perfectly justifiable for Bell to rely 
on a company such as Outdoor Systems to provide advertising space 
that could effectively carry a message. There is no dispute that 
the billboard was materially deficient and, thus, there was a 
failure of consideration. As a matter of law, Bell acted without 
fault. The trial court erroneously concluded that Bell could not 
sustain its affirmative defense of failure of consideration and 
for that reason the judgment should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT BELL DID NOT 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPUDIATE THE ADVERTISING AGREEMENT. 
The trial court' s fourth conclusion of law states: 
The defendant has claimed that it had a 
right to reject the contract and that it 
exercised that right. The defendant bases 
its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second 
page of the contract. The Court agrees that 
defendant' s concern with regard to 
readability and the effectiveness of the sign 
was communicated to the plaintiff within a 
reasonable time. The issue, therefore, is: 
Can paragraph 10 of the contract be 
reasonably interpreted to give the defendant 
a right to total rejection upon 
dissatisfaction with the final product? The 
court finds that such a reading cannot be 
given to the contract for the reason that 
paragraph 10 of the contract does not go that 
far and does not support Defendant7 s claim of 
right to rejection of the entire contract. 
(Conclusion, No. 4. ) 
The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law and 
a trial court' s interpretation of a contract provision is 
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accorded no particular deference. Morris v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. , 658 P. 2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983). 
Paragraph 10 of the Advertising Agreement stated: 
(Advertiser) (Agency) shall inspect the 
display within days after 
installation. Unless within such period, 
(Advertiser) (Agency) gives written notice to 
OUTDOOR specifying any defect, the display 
shall be conclusively presumed to have been 
inspected and approved for all purposes 
whatsoever by (Advertiser) (Agency). 
The trial court specifically found that Bell met any time 
limitations imposed by this paragraph. (Conclusion No. 4. See 
also Trial Transcript p. 58 [testimony of Bruce Brossart, sales 
manager for Outdoor Systems that Bell gave timely notice]). Thus 
analysis of paragraph 10 raises two issues of contract 
interpretation: First, whether the inability of the board to 
advertise was a "defect," and second, whether Bell could 
repudiate the Advertising Agreement when Outdoor Systems failed 
to cure the defect. 
The trial court, consistent with its constricted view 
of Outdoor Systems' contractual duties noted at pages 8 through 
10 supra, confined its definition of "defect" to the reproduction 
of the display. (See Finding No. 34. ) However, such a 
definition of the term "defect" in a commercial setting is far 
too narrow. The Texas Supreme Court recently held, in the 
context of an implied warranty of merchantability, that "the word 
' defect' means a condition of the goods that renders them unfit 
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for the ordinary purposes for which they are used because of a 
lack of something necessary for adequacy. " Plas-Tex, Inc. v. 
U.S. Steel Corp. . 772 S. W. 2d 442, 444 (Texas 1989) (emphasis 
added). Such a definition considers the entire purpose of the 
contract and not just one aspect of the bargained for 
performance. In the present case, it is undisputed that the sign 
provided by Outdoor Systems, because of its location, lacked a 
trait necessary for adequacy—i. e. , visibility. This was clearly 
recognized by Outdoor Systems soon after the Advertising 
Agreement was signed, but even the alteration of the graphics 
urged by Outdoor Systems did not cure the defect. 
Given that the billboard was defective, the sole 
remaining issue is the nature of the remedy under the Advertising 
Agreement. The only reasonable interpretation of Paragraph 10 is 
that, absent Outdoor System' s cure of a defect timely noted, Bell 
could repudiate the contract and refuse to pay. After it gave 
timely notice to Outdoor Systems of the defect, Bell went so far 
as to propose a solution to cure the defect--re-painting the 
board to all graphics. (Finding No. 26. ) However, Outdoor 
Systems wrongfully insisted that Bell bear the cost of any 
repainting thereby leaving Bell with only the option of rejecting 
the contract. Bell elected this option consistent with the terms 
of the Advertising Agreement. The trial court erred in 
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concluding that Outdoor Systems was not in breach of paragraph 
10. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT ASSUMPTION 
QF fi?$K ^EQATgg A PEFENgE QF EPTgAj, MISTAKE 
The trial court further erred in holding that "mutual 
mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was a risk 
which was assumed by the parties" and that "the risk of the 
effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by the defendant 
and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by reason of mutual 
mistake. " (Conclusion No. 9. ) 
The governing authorities make no mention of assumption 
of risk in connection with the law of mutual mistake. Rather, 
this Court has held that "a mutual mistake occurs when both 
parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about 
a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their 
bargain. " Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P. 2d 554, 557 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). "Mutual mistake of fact 
makes a contract voidable, and is a basis for equitable 
recision." £d. (citations omitted). The key inquiry is whether 
there was a misconception, not whether some risk was assumed. 
The evidence in this case, giving all reasonable doubt 
to Outdoor Systems, shows that both parties to the Advertising 
Agreement proceeded initially under the assumption that the 
Outdoor Systems board could effectively carry an adequate 
advertising message, without material limitation on the form or 
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content of the ad. This assumption was at the heart of the 
agreement. Bell needed effective advertisement and Outdoor 
Systems could not stay in business long selling space that did 
not advertise. However, in the course of performance it became 
apparent that there were significant limitations to the board' s 
capabilities. This was first recognized to some degree by 
Outdoor Systems in January, 1989. Later, once the billboard was 
in place, both parties fully recognized the board' s deficiencies. 
A mutual mistake of fact occurred. 
The trial court erred in concluding that assumption of 
the risk negates defense of mutual mistake and that Bell assumed 
the risk of the effectiveness of the sign. The facts as found by 
the trial court do not support this conclusion. Bell did assume 
the risk that the design of the advertisement might not be 
effective in drawing travelers to Kino Springs. However, that 
risk was founded on the reasonable assumption that the design on 
the billboard would at least be visible to travelers. It was 
not. 
Once again, the trial court apportioned fault to Bell 
for failing to discover the great distance of the sign from the 
road. However, as already noted, "a mistaken party's fault in 
failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract 
does not bar him from avoidance or reformation . . . unless his 
fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance 
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with reasonable standards of fair dealing. »' Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 157 (1979). Bell's conduct met this standard. No 
claim can be made that Bell did not act with the utmost good 
faith and within reasonable standards of fair dealing. 
The mutual mistake of the parties was the assumption 
that the finished billboard would be visible from Interstate 19. 
Absent actual knowledge or reasonable notice, Bell could not have 
assumed the risk that, as Outdoor Systems knew, the sign would be 
200 yards from the point of optimal visibility. This was not 
within the reasonable range of possibilities that Bell could have 
contemplated. The trial court erred in concluding that an 
advertiser assumes the risk that the advertising space offered 
for lease without limitation would not physically be visible by 
the very people to whom it is directed. Such a conclusion is 
erroneous as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this matter entered conclusions of 
law based on erroneous legal standards and at variance with its 
own Findings of Facts and other undisputed facts. Effective 
advertising was the essence of the agreement of the parties. 
Outdoor Systems instead provided a sign with no advertising value 
to Bell. The trial court erred in concluding that (a) this was 
not a failure of consideration, (b) Bell did not have the 
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contractual right to reject the contract when it learned of the 
material defects in the sign provided, and (c) that a mistake of 
fact did not occur. 
The appellant Bruce Bell and Associates, Inc. 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and remand the case with directions that judgment be 
entered for the appellant, awarding costs on appeal and 
attorneys' fees pursuant to the Advertising Agreement and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 5. 
DATED this J_ day of February, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By /M(A <C - ^/^y 
yJE±irt/C. Olson / / Douglas C. Tingey 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant Bruce Bell & 
Associates, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E r i c C. O l s o n ( 4 1 0 8 ) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC., ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCISIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Ctfvil No. 893C06965CV 
BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES, ) Honorable Judge Watson 
INC. , a Utah Corporation, ) 
Defendant. ) 
_) 
Trial of the above-referenced matter was heard before 
the bench on August 7, 1990, before the Honorable Edward A. 
Watson. Paul H. Van Dyke of Elggren & Van Dyke appeared on 
behalf of the Plaintiff. Eric C. Olson of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy appeared on behalf of the defendant. 
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was taken on behalf of both 
Plaintiff and Defendant. The Court, having now considered all 
the evidence and the arguments of the counsel and for good cause 
therefore appearing, hereby enters it: 
FINDINGS OF ThQl 
1. The plaintiff is an outdoor advertising company, 
in the business of providing outdoor advertising space and 
preparing signs for its various clients. 
2. The defendant is an advertising firm based in 
Salt Lake City. 
3. At all times relevant, both Plaintiff and 
Defendant were represented in all matters relevant to this case 
by individuals having substantial experience in outdoor 
advertising. 
4. The defendant Bruce Bell & Associates had, prior 
to the contract at issue with the Plaintiff, previously rendered 
services for its client, Kino Springs. 
5. The defendant had earlier prepared a magazine 
advertisement for Kino Springs and decided that a follow-up 
billboard advertisement should be put in place. The billboard 
was to follow the concept of the magazine advertisement in that 
is (sic) should be a pictorial and should be dignified. 
6. In late October, 1988, Kino Springs directed the 
defendant to prepare a design for and obtain a space for 
displaying an outdoor sign in Arizona located on 1-19 south of 
Amado. 
7. In connection with the directions from Kino 
Springs, the defendant, by and through Bruce Bell, called 
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Plaintiff's representative, Steve Brossart, and enquired of th 
availability of advertising space. 
8. At the time of the call, the plaintiff was 
completing a new sign in the are of interest to Kino Springs. 
It was the only sign available in the area. 
9. Steve Brossart sent a packet of information to 
the defendant as a follow-up to the conversation which packet 
was entered into evidence as Exhibits M D-3", "0-33", "D-3b'f an 
"D-3c" consisting, among other things, of photographs of the 
sign taken by Steve Brossart. 
10. The defendant contacted Kino Springs and 
requested that it send a representative to drive by the sign 
location and approve it. This was accomplished. 
11. The defendant ordinarily would have had one of 
its own employees drive-by and approve the sign location but d 
not do so in this instance because the location was out-of-
state. The sign was located eight miles south of Green Valley 
Arizona. According, it made an economic decision to have its 
client do the drive-by. 
12. An employee of Kino Springs approved the sign 
location. 
13. Steve Brossart called Bruce Bell shortly 
thereafter. Mr. Bell indicated that the location was approved 
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and said that he would sign the contract earlier submitted for a 
one year term, 
14. The signed contract was faxed back to the 
plaintiff. Art work for the design of the sign was to follow. 
15. Bruce Bell and the defendant created a concept 
for the outdoor advertising following the concept used earlier 
in a magazine advertisement, which included 
a. A picture which was to realistically depict 
Kino Springs; 
b. Copy work necessary for the sign; 
c. Art work prepared by an outside contractor; 
and, 
d. Directional language for the sign. 
16. The above decisions made by Mr. Bell with respect 
to the sign design were consciously made knowing that the sign 
was to be cross-reader. 
17 The outside artist prepared a mock-up of the sign 
which was intended to be proportionate to the finished sign. 
18. A copy of the artwork and mock-up for the 
billboard were sent to Kino Springs by the defendant for 
approval They v.ere approved and later sent by the defendant to 
the plaintiff for reproduction in the creation of the billboard. 
19. The artwork which was submitted by the defendant 
to Plaintiff had various overlays to show color, graphics, 
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proportion and, in general, all detail to be included in the 
sign. 
20. Upon receiving the artwork, Steve Brossart, 
representing the plaintiff, expressed concerns to Mr. Bell 
concerning the readability of the graphics. In particular, Mr. 
Brossart was concerned that the graphics were too small to be 
read from the ughvay and recommended to Mr. Bell tr.at the size 
of the graphics be increased or that, to improve readability, 
the sign be all graphic and the pictorial be eliminated. 
21. Mr. Bell decided to keep the pictorial but agreed 
with Mr. Brossart's recomrendation to increase the size of the 
graphic be extending the width of the sign and, thereby, 
increase the size of the letters and, at the same time, keep the 
letters proportional to the pictorial. Mr. Bell specifically 
requested that the graphics and pictorial be proportionate. 
22. The sign was thereafter constructed and a 
completion package was sent by Plaintiff to the defendant. The 
advertisement was hung on the billboard on February 15, 1989. 
23. The completion package did not indicate how far 
the sign was from the various lanes of highway. That 
information was not specifically requested by Defendant of (sic) 
Plaintiff and the information, though in the files of Plaintiff, 
was not readily available to Mr. Brossart. 
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24. The defendant, thereafter, asked as 
representative of Kino Springs to drive by the sign for its 
approval. 
25. The defendant was advised by Kino Springs that 
the sign was not visible from the highway and that it did not 
approve of the sign. 
26. On or about March 1, 1989, the defendant advised 
Steve Brossart of Plaintiff that the client, Kino Springs, was 
not happy with the sign and asked for the possibility of having 
the sign re-painted to show all graphics. Mr. Brossart advised 
that it would be acceptable if the client would bear the cost of 
re-painting. 
27. The contract entered into between Plaintiff and 
Defendant specifically indicated that in the event re-painting 
was necessary, that the defendant and not the plaintiff would be 
responsible for the expense of the re-painting. 
28. The defendant later contacted the plaintiff and 
indicated that the defendant felt that the plaintiff should bear 
the cost of re-painting. The plaintiff declined to re-paint the 
sign at its own expense. 
29. Cancellation of the sign was later discussed. 
Plaintiff agreed to attempt to obtain new advertising for the 
space but indicated that the defendant must pay for the space 
until it was resold. 
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30. The parties also had a discussion with respect to 
relocating the sign to Kino Springs as a form of settlement. 
31. None of the settlement negotiations resulted in a 
resolution of the matter and no settlement agreement was 
obtained. 
32. After the sign was in place, Steve Brossart, of 
Plaintiff, drove by the sign and, in his opinion, the graphics 
were not readily seen but the pictorial could be seen. 
33. After the sign was in place, Larry Pinnock, a 
representative of Defendant, drove by the sign three times and 
could not see the sign on his dnve-bys. On his last drive-by, 
he took a number of measurements with respect to the distance of 
the sign from the highway. Those measurements, which are 
undisputed, show that the sign was approximately 200 yards from 
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lane of traffic 
on 1-19. 
34. The defendant admits that there were no defects 
in the reproduction of the display, that it was prepared 
pursuant to the instructions of the defendant and that the sign 
was maintained for the full twelve month contract. 
Additionally, the defendant was regularly invoiced for each 
month of the contract. The defendant failed and refused to make 
any payment therefore. 
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35. The pa r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t the p r inc ipa l amount 
unpaid under the terms of the contract i s the sum of $8,323. 20, 
p lus i n t e r e s t a t 1 1/2% per month on a l l unpaid balances. 
36. The pa r t i e s reserved, pending the final dec i s ion 
of t h i s mat te r , the issue of a t torney's fees . The con t rac t does 
provide for an award of a t t o r n e y ' s fees to the p reva i l ing par ty . 
37. The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e damages c la imed 
would not exceed the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l l i m i t s of t h i s Court . 
From the fo rego ing F i n d i n g s of F a c t , the Court now 
makes and e n t e r s i t s : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court f inds t h a t the defendant f a i l ed to pay 
the con t r ac t amount based upon i t s expec t a t i on that the 
p l a i n t i f f would provide a s ign l o c a t i o n which would be 
e f f e c t i v e . The Court finds t h a t t h e r e i s nothing in the 
con t r ac t which requires the p l a i n t i f f to meet th i s expec ta t ion 
of Defendant. Rather, the p l a i n t i f f s con t rac tua l duty was to 
f a i t h f u l l y reproduce the s ign from the artwork provided to i t by 
defendant. 
2. The defendant has defended aga ins t P l a i n t i f f ' s 
claim on the hasis that t h e r e was no f a i l u r e of cons idera t ion . 
The Court f inds that there was no such f a i l u r e of cons ide ra t ion 
because such a finding r e q u i r e s a f inding t h a t the par ty making 
the claim be without fau l t . The Court s p e c i f i c a l l y finds and 
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concludes that the defendant was negligent by not viewing tr.e 
sign location itself prior to the completion of the contract. 
3. The Court finds that although there may have been 
unequal consideration in this contract that the disparity in 
consideration was not unconscionable and, therefore, does not 
find a failure of consideration by reason of unconscionability 
in the disparity of consideration. 
4. The defendant has claimed that it had a right to 
re]ect the contract and that it exercised that right. The 
defendant bases its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second page 
of the contract. The Court agrees that defendant's concern with 
regard to readability and the effectiveness of the sign was 
communicated to the plaintiff within a reasonable time. The 
issue, therefore, is: Can paragraph 10 of the contract be 
reasonably interpreted to give the defendant a right to total 
rejection upon dissatisfaction with the final product? The 
Court finds that such a reading cannot be given to the contract 
for the reason that paragraph 10 of the contract does not go 
that far and dees not support Defendant' s claim of right to 
rejection of the entire contract. 
5. The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's 
claim on the basis of mutual mistake. The Court finds that 
mutual mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was 
a risk which was assumed by the parties. The Court finds that 
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the risk of the effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by 
the defendant and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by 
reason of mutual mistake. 
6. Additionally, the Court finds that mutual mistake 
is not a viable defense if the mistake concerns a prediction or 
judgment. The Court finds that the effectiveness of the sign 
was a prediction or judgment made by the defendant despite the 
advise by Steve Brossart that the sign should be changed to all 
graphic to be readable. 
7. The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment in the sum of $8,323.20 principal amounts, together 
with interest on the unpaid balances at 1 1/2% per month, plus 
Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The judgment 
shall not, by stipulation of the parties, exceed the 
jurisdictional limit of the Court. 
8. Judgment should be rendered accordingly. 
, 1990. DATED this 3 day of (rbJlCv 
BY OURT 
STODGE 
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I hereby certify that I caused ^ r true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, this f day of February, 1991, to the 
following: 
Paul H. Van Dyke 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
261 East 300 South, #175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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